董事会作为公司治理的核心，对会计信息质量负有直接的监管责任，合理、有效的董事会治理机制能从一定程度上抑制经理层的盈余管理行为，提高会计盈余信息的可信性，从而提高会计盈余的信息含量。因此，董事会特征与盈余信息含量之间存在何种关系是一个值得深入探讨的问题，并且这种关系是否会因股权结构的不同而呈现差异仍有待检验，本文试图回答以上两个问题。
    本文在相关文献回顾和理论分析的基础之上，利用我国上市公司2005年的数据对董事会特征与盈余信息含量的关系进行了探讨。在研究过程中针对董事会结构特征和行为特征，考虑到股权结构的影响，分别使用分组检验和三项交互模型检验法考察了这两类特征对盈余信息含量的影响。对董事会人员素质特征，未考虑股权结构的影响，采用两项交互模型检验了这类特征与盈余信息含量的关系。研究发现：（1）在董事会结构方面特征，董事会规模与盈余信息含量之间存在显著的正相关关系，对非国有控股公司来说，董事会规模对盈余信息含量的积极影响更明显；对国有控股公司来说,董事长兼任总经理与公司盈余信息含量之间具有显著负相关关系；国有控股公司独立董事比例与盈余信息含量呈显著正相关关系。（2）在董事会行为特征方面，国有控股公司董事会年度会议次数与盈余信息含量显著正相关。（3）在董事会人员素质特征方面，董事会中财务专业董事的比例与盈余信息含量之间不存在显著相关关系，董事从业经验人员比例与盈余信息含量之间存在显著的正相关关系。最后本文根据研究结论，提出一些政策建议。

As the core of corporate governance, Board of Directors has direct responsibility for supervision of the quality of accounting information, to a certain extent, reasonable and effective governance mechanisms from the Board of Directors can control managers’ behavior of earnings management, and improve the credibility of accounting earnings information, in order to improve accounting earnings informativeness. As a result, the relationship between the characteristics of Board of Directors and earnings informativeness is a problem is worthy of in-depth discussion, and whether this relationship will be different as a result of the difference of ownership structure has yet to be tested, this article attempts to answer above two questions.
Based on the relative literature review and theoretical analysis, this article discusses the relationship between the characteristics of Board of Directors and earnings informativeness by using Chinese listed companies’ data in 2005. The course of the study on the structural characteristics of the Board of Directors and behavioral characteristics takes into account the Impact of stock equity structure, and tests two types of features on the earnings informativeness by using the respective groups test and three-cross test model. To the quality characteristics of Board of Directors, this article does not consider the effect of ownership structure, using a two interactive test model to test that relationship. The study found: (1) Between structural characteristics of the Board of Directors, scales of Board of Directors and earnings informativeness have significantly positive correlation, to the Non-state-owned Holding Companies, the size of the Board of Directors has more evident influence on earnings informativeness; to the State-controlled Companies, between CEO duality and earnings informativeness have a significant negative correlation; and between the proportion of State-owned Holding Companies’ independent directors and earnings informativeness have a significantly positive correlation. (2) In the behavioral characteristics of the Board, the number of the annual meetings of State-controlled Companies’ board directors has a significantly positive correlation with earnings informativeness. (3) In the quality characteristics of the Board of Directors, the proportion of financial professional directors in Board of Directors does not have significant correlation with earnings informativeness, and the proportion of salted Directors has a significantly positive correlation with earnings informativeness. Finally, this article puts forward policy recommendations in the light of the conclusions.